There exists a demerit in normal attribute based signature, whose length of the signature depends on the largest size of attributes set. In this paper, an attribute-based signature scheme with constant size is proposed. It is proved to be unforgeable and unconditionally anonymous in the standard model. The security of the scheme is based on Computational Diffie Hellman(CDH) problem.
Introduction
In 1984, Shamir proposed a kind of identity based cryptosystems [1] , where the public key can be an arbitrary string such as an email address or a telephone number, etc. In 2005, Sahai and Waters proposed a Fuzzy identity-based encryption [2] , which is a generalization to identity-based cryptosystem. In 2008, Maji et al. first introduced an attribute-based signature (ABS) [3] , which has many important applications such as in fine-graind access control scenarios with anonymous authentication systems. In this signature, messages are signed by using some predicate of their attributes issued from an attribute authority, albeit the security of their scheme is only proved in the generic group model. Li and Kim [4] constructed an attribute-based ring signature of (n, n)-threshold, where n is the number of attributes purported in the signature, and the scheme is secure under the standard computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Later, Shahandashti and SafaviNaini [5] extended [4] and presented an ABS scheme supporting (k, n)-threshold. However, [4] [5] are not very efficient because the signature of a message is generated individually with respect to private key for each attribute purported in the signature. In 2010, Li and Kim [6] proposed two efficient ABS constructions supporting flexible threshold predicate by exploring a new technique to generate signatures, but the length of the signature depends on the largest size of attributes set. Recently,Wen qiang and Shao zhen introduced an attribute-based ring signature scheme with constant size for the first time [7] , which allow the signer to freely choose how much information is being leaked by carefully selecting the members of the ring, while the attribute-signer privacy in attribute-based signatures requires the verifier only knows whether the signer owns attributes satisfying the predicate through signature.
In this paper, we propose an Attribute-based signature scheme with constant size signature, which supports non monotone access structure. It is proved to be unforgeable and unconditionally anonymous in the standard model. The security of the scheme is reduced to based on Computational Diffie Hellman(CDH) problem.
Related Work
Ring and mesh signatures: A user as a member of possible signers uses ring signatures [8] to sign a message, without revealing exactly one's identity actually generated the signature. Mesh signature [9] is an extension of ring signature which allows a rich predicate in the signature, albeit this approach fails a crucial unforgeability requirement because multiple users can collude by pooling their attributes together and create signatures which none of them could produce individually.
Attribute-based encryption: ABE was first introduced by Sahai and Waters [2] in the context of a generalization of IBE called Fuzzy IBE, which is an ABE that allows only single threshold access structures. Later, two flavors of ABE were proposed: key-policy ABE, where a ciphertext is associated to a list of attributes, and a secret key is associated to a policy for decryption; and ciphertext-policy ABE, where secret keys are associated to a list of attributes The first construction of KP-ABE which allows any monotone access structures was provided by Goyal et al. [10] . After then, Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [11] proposed the first CP-ABE scheme, but the security of their scheme was only proved in the generic group model. Ostrovsky, Sahai, and Waters subsequently extended both schemes to support any non monotone structures [12] . Cheung and Newport [13] proposed a CP-ABE scheme that allows only AND gate which could be proved in the standard model, while Goyal et al. [14] proposed a bounded CP-ABE scheme which allows only a priori bounded size of gates. Waters [15] proposed the first fully expressive CP-ABE in the standard model. Later, Emura et al. suggested a scheme with short ciphertexts [22] but policies are restricted to a single AND gate. Herranz et al. [16] described a scheme with threshold access policies. Recently, Attrapadung and Libert [17] proposed the first fully expressive KP-ABE with constant-size ciphertexts. What's more, some extensions to multi-authority schemes were considered in [18] [19] . Besides the two usual flavors of ABE, another recently considered kind of ABE schemes, called dual-policy ABE, was proposed in [20] .
Organization of the paper: In section 2, We review the concepts of preliminaries. We introduce the definition and secure model of attribute-based signatures in section 3. Then we introduce our ABS scheme in section 4 and give its security analysis in section 5. Finally, we conclude our work.
Preliminaries
We give a brief review on the property of pairings and some candidate hard problems from pairings that will be used later.
Bilinear pairings[21]
Let G 1 and G 2 be cyclic groups of prime order p with the multiplicative group action and g is a generator of G 1 . Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a map with the following properties:
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for all u, v ∈ G 1 .
Complexity assumption Definition 1
The computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) problem is that, given a group G 1 of prime order p with generator g and elements (g a , g b ) ∈ G 1 , where a, b are selected uniformly at random from Z p , to compute g ab we say that the (t, ε)-CDH assumption holds in G 1 if no algorithm running in time at most t can solve the CDH problem in G 1 with probability at least ε .
Attribute-based Signature Scheme
In this section, we formalize the definition and security model of attribute-based signature.
Syntax
An ABS scheme consists of four algorithms, namely, setup algorithm Setup, private key extraction algorithm Extract, signing algorithm Sign, and verification algorithm Verify. The algorithms are defined as follows.
Setup: On input 1
λ , where λ is the security parameter, this algorithm outputs public parameters params P K and M K as a master secret key for attribute authority;
Extract: Suppose that a user requests an attribute set L. The attribute authority computes SK L as the attribute private key with M K if the user is eligible to be issued with these attributes.
Sign: Assume a user wants to sign a message M with a predicate W and a set of attributes satisfy L = W , he takes as input his attribute private key SK L for attributes L, outputs signature σ.
Verify: After receiving a signature σ on message M and attributes L with respect to a predicate W , the signature is valid if L = W and the signature is valid. This algorithm outputs a boolean value accept or reject to denote if the signature is correct or not.
Unforgeability
An ABS scheme is unforgeable if the success probability of any polynomial time adversary in the following experiment is negligible:
(1) Set-up: Challenger B is given the challenge access structure W * from an attacker A, B chooses a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs the set-up ( 
Perfect privacy
Definition 3 An ABS scheme is perfectly private if, for all (
If the perfect privacy requirement holds, then a signature does not leak whom was used to generate it. This holds even if the adversary has unbounded computational resources and has access to the signer's private keys.
Our Construction
In this section, we propose a constant size signature scheme. Let G 1 and G T be cyclic groups of prime order p and e : 
Proposed scheme
Setup: A trusted authority T A chooses a prime p, a bilinear group (G 1 , G T ) with order p, then, chooses a random integer a∈ R Z * p and a random generator g ∈ G 1 and compute g 1 = g a , and g 2 ∈ G 1 , and
A collision-resistance hash function is also chosen such that H m : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} nm for n m ∈ Z.Finally, selects the following elements randomly
The master private key is M K = (g a 2 , {t i,j } i∈{1,··· ,n},j∈{1,··· ,n i } ) and the public parameters are 
If it holds, outputs accept, which indicates the signature indeed from some user with attributes among W (indeed that L = W ). Otherwise, outputs reject.
Security Analysis
In this Section, we will discuss the security of the proposed attribute-based signature scheme.
Correctness
The correctness of verification is justified by the following equations:
Unforgeability Theorem 1
The attribute based signature scheme we proposed is (ε, t, q e , q s )-unforgeable, assuming that the (ε ′ , t ′ )-CDH assumption holds in G 1 , where t ′ < t + (2q e + 3q s )t exp , t exp is the maximum time for an exponentiation in G 1 , and
.
Proof:
The construction can be proven in the selective sets security model. Suppose that an adversary A has an advantage ε in forge a signature, we build an algorithm B that uses A to solve the CDH problem. Algorithm B is given (g; X = g a ; Y = g b ) and asked to compute g ab .
Setup: First, B is given the challenge access structure 
Extraction oracle: Upon receiving a query for a private key of signature attributes L, although B does not know the master secret, it can still construct the private key. there exists , and computes
).We can check that SK L is a valid secret key simply. 
L(m * ) ,which is the solution to the CDH problem. Otherwise, B aborts.
Probability analysis:
For the simulation to complete without aborting, we require the following conditions satisfied:
we can compute the probability is Define the events:A :
{K(m * ) = 0 mod q}.
The probability of B not abort is Pr
So the probability of A not abort isPr(abort) ≥ (1 − N 2 /p) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an attribute-based signature (ABS) schemes with constant size signature. The security of our schemes has been proven under the standard computational DiffieHellman assumption.
